Introduction
The development of the rubber boom in the Brazilian Amazon is shrouded by myths and legends that reflect the high profits accrued in a region that was considered by most, a pre-capitalist society. In this context, Manaus Opera House is paradigmatic: the building is a monument to rubber bonanza. Inaugurated in December 1896, it is still preserved in its original style: eclectic and neo-classic architecture built with materials and a labor force brought from Europe. In Belém, the main rubber hub, another sumptuous theatre had been built from rubber proceeds some years earlier, the Theatro da Paz (Theatre of Peace). During the rubber boom, it was said that Manaus diamond consumption per capita was the largest in the world, men walked with canes topped in gold and silver, children went to school in Paris or Lausanne and almost 2,500
inhabitants took first-class tickets to Europe every year. Houses were decorated in Parisien style where "pre-dinner drinks were usually sipped from silver champagne goblets set on Carrara marble-topped tables with bases of solid gold". 2 In addition, it was also said that Havana cigars were lit with bank notes of 500 milréis (equivalent to 20 pounds at the 1900 exchange rate) and that every toothache was treated in Europe. 3 Exaggeration or not, these descriptions of the rubber boom reflect the rapid wealth that flowed to the region from 1870 to 1910, capturing the imagination of many people around the world and fuelling immigration.
Despite these accounts of money squandering, the literature on the rubber boom has resorted to a Dependendist view of rubber production in the Brazilian Amazon in which foreigners appropriated and sent abroad most of the wealth accumulated from rubber production. This view is in tune with the Global Commodity Chain approach that argues that manufacturing/core economies absorb the bulk of surplus generated in the commodity chain. This paper challenges both approaches and asks for a more careful analysis of the business history of commodity chains. The business analysis at the micro level may falsify or verify assertions made at the macro level, which had been the usual level of analysis of commodity chains so far. By rejecting the Global Commodity Chain approach, it is necessary to examine more carefully the historical evolution of the commodity chain. This paper is a first step in this direction through a business history of the relationship between two nodes of the rubber chain: exporters placed in Brazil and importers placed in industrialized countries.
The paper is organized in 6 sections, including this introduction. Section 2 provides a discussion on the Global Commodity Chain Approach, highlighting its main assumptions and works as well as its limitations. Section 3 presents the rubber chain and explains the Dependentist view on the rubber trade in the Brazilian Amazon during the rubber boom . Section 4 discusses some of the stylized facts that contradict assumptions made by the Dependentist view whereas Section 5 provides an analysis of the relationship between two nodes of the rubber chain by using business archives.
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
The Global Commodity Chain Approach
The Global Commodity Chain (GCC) approach addresses questions about what products countries do (and should) import and export in relation to complex institutions. Instead of deriving trade patterns from optimizing behavior of rational economic agents, for GCC, trade is taken as embedded in, and to a considerable extent as determined by, specific (but changing) institutional structures. 4 GCC is ultimately the development of the World-System Theory at the micro level. It is thus imperative to discuss the main features of this theory before analyzing the Global Commodity Chain approach.
A social-system is a self-contained unit of analysis as the dynamics of its development is mainly internal. Only small autonomous subsistence economies and world-systems can be considered as actual social systems. According to Wallerstein, a world-system is thus "a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence". 5 In history, there have only existed two types of world-systems: world-empires, in which there was a single political system over the whole area, and world-economies in which such political system did not exist.
According to Wallerstein, it was exactly the absence of a single political system that allowed capitalism to operate within an arena larger than any political entity could actually control, giving capitalists room for maneuver that was structurally based.
Geographical factors such as transport and communication defined the borders of this world-system, inside which an extensive division of labor developed. This division of labor was geographical and arose not only from ecological factors as it was also a function of the social organization of work: following a Marxist framework, it magnified and legitimized the ability of some groups within the system to exploit others. As a consequence, a clear-cut division between core-states and peripheral areas arose.
Whereas core-states were those where a strong state machinery and a national culture were created to ensure the coherence of the world-system and to justify disparities that had arisen within the world-system, peripheral areas were those where the indigenous 4 Raikes, Jensen and Ponte (2000, p. 394) . 5 Wallerstein (1976, p. 347 ).
states were weak, ranging from non-existence (e.g. colonial situation) to one with a low degree of autonomy (such as neo-colonial situation). Core-states were thus understood as those that possessed sovereignty vis-à-vis other states which additionally were strong before any particular social group within the state. There were also semiperipheral areas which were in between the core and the periphery: some of those areas had been either a core-state of a given world-economy or a peripheral area that was promoted as a result of changing geopolitics of an expanding world-economy. It is possible to infer then that for Wallerstein, state structures were relatively strong in the core-areas and relatively weak in the periphery. 6
The aforementioned division of labor entails a hierarchy of occupational tasks in which core-states concentrated higher levels of skill and capital. Since a capitalist worldeconomy essentially rewarded accumulated capital (including human capital) at a higher rate than raw labor, the system was prone to self-maintenance and to increasing disparity. Moreover, the absence of a central political entity made it very difficult to employ counteracting measures to remedy this maldistribution of rewards. This maldistribution of rewards, in turn, did not necessarily generate the seeds of internal discontentment and dissolution since with the expansion of the system (especially through technological developments) ever new areas were being absorbed. This process of development in the periphery (and in the semiperiphery) then masked the inequality of rewards. 7
Wallerstein's framework is based essentially on the nation-state and consequently individual workers, entrepreneurs, industries and firms were either neglected in his analysis or assigned a secondary role. As these players influence the functioning of the 6 Wallerstein (1976) . 7 Wallerstein (1976) .
world-system, it was necessary to integrate them into the Wallersteinian framework.
That is exactly one of the initial objectives of the global commodity chain (GCC) literature: according to its proponents, by tracing the network of commodity chains, it is possible to track the underlying division and integration of labor processes and thus monitor the constant development and transformation of the world-economy's production system. 8 In this context, a commodity chain is understood as a "network of labor and production processes whose end result is a finished commodity" 9 . For analytical purposes, the chain is assumed to be comprised of several nodes or "boxes" that correspond to quite specific production processes. The boundaries of a given box are taken as socially constructed and locally integrated, highlighting the social embeddedness of economic organization. Therefore, a box may be redefined, reconstructed, consolidated or subdivided based on technical or social organizational changes.
In short, a "GCC consists of a set of interorganizational networks clustered around one commodity or product, linking households, enterprises, and states to one another within the world-economy" 10 . At the macro level, all these networks are constituents of the world-system in which an extensive division of labor exists along geographic lines. This division of labor is understood as being usually triggered by a globalization process of production and trade. 11 For analytical purposes, such globalization process may be subdivided into three different phases: a) investmentbased globalization when the multinational spread of transnational corporations accelerated in a growing number of manufacturing and raw material 8 Hopkins and Wallerstein (1994, p. 17) . 9 Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986, p. 159) . 10 Gereffi, Korzeniewicz and Korzeniewicz (1994, p. 2 industries; b) trade-based globalization was based on the rapid and diversified industrialization of a wide range of developing nations, changing the center of gravity for many manufacturing industries; c) digital globalization (1995 to date)
when an information revolution developed as a consequence of the rapid spread of connectivity, impacting on business strategies.
The result of this ongoing globalization process is the emergence of a worldwide manufacturing system in which production capacity is dispersed to an unprecedented number of developing as well as industrialized countries. This globalization pattern implies a degree of functional integration between and control over internationally dispersed activities that span over core, semiperipheral and peripheral areas 12 . This international dispersion of activities, in turn, follows a hierarchy whose rationale is given by the world-system theory: a relatively greater share of wealth accrues to corelike nodes than to peripheral ones, underscoring the fact that, by construction, the periphery produces raw materials whereas the core produces industrial products. Even though this is too simple and might not be true for all commodity chains, it should be true for the world-economy as a whole.
Therefore, hierarchy among countries at the macro-level (periphery versus core areas in the world-system theory) translates into a relation of power among nodes along a commodity chain at the micro level (GCC). Power here is defined as the ability to coordinate and control transnational production systems, which can be structured and categorized in two different ways: as producer-driven or buyer-driven. On the one hand, "producer-driven commodity chains are those industries in which transnational corporations or other large integrated industrial enterprises play the central role in 12 Gereffi (1994, pp. 95-96) .
controlling the production system (including its backward and forward linkages)" 13 . The distinctive feature of the producer-driven commodity chain is the degree of control exercised by the headquarters of transnational corporations. On the other hand, "buyerdriven commodity chains refer to those industries in which large retailers, brand-name merchandisers, and trading companies play the pivotal role in setting up decentralized production networks in a variety of exporting countries, typically located in the Third
World" 14 .
Ultimately, under the GCC framework, power assures that the most profitable nodes will be located in core areas. According to Hopkins and Wallerstein, monopoly and competition are key to understand the distribution of wealth among the nodes in a commodity chain (and in aggregate, for the world-system as a whole Gereffi (1994, p. 97) . 14 Gereffi (1994, p. 97) . 15 Hopkins and Wallerstein (1994, p. 18) . 16 Hopkins and Wallerstein (1994, pp. 19-20) .
The underlying idea of the Global Commodity Chain framework is thus that, by describing and analyzing a commodity chain, it is possible to show how social relations shape production, distribution, and consumption in a given industry or sector. Even though theoretically it could be applied to all commodity chains (maybe requiring sometimes some adaptations), GCC has mainly been applied to industrial chains such as apparel 17 , semi-conductors 18 , automobiles 19 and footwear 20 despite some attempts to apply it to other areas such as services 21 , fresh fruit and vegetables 22 and illegal commodities 23 . Therefore, the rubber chain has been so far left out. However, it will be argued here that the GCC approach does not provide a suitable framework to analyze the rubber chain and thus an alternative theory/model needs to be found.
The Global Commodity Chain approach is a development of the world-system theory at the micro level. As such, it is an extension of the dependency theory. Instead of the Prebischian notion of dependency being created from increasingly unequal terms of trade 24 , in the world-system the global market is an uneven playing field, underscored by the existing hierarchy between core and periphery areas that translates into a relation of power between nodes of the commodity chain located in these two areas. Proponents of the GCC approach have seldom appropriately defined the concept of 'power'. It is certainly the equivalent of the hierarchy existent at the macro level but its underlying rationale is usually lacking. For Hopkins and Wallerstein, core areas derive power over peripheral (and semiperipheral) areas out of the development and possession of more advanced technologies and consequently by high degrees of market power whereas, for 17 Gereffi (1999) . 18 Henderson (1989) . 19 Doner (1991) . 20 Schmitz (1999) . 21 Rabach and Kim (1994) . 22 Reynolds (1994) . 23 Wilson and Zambrano (1994) . 24 See for instance Love (1980) . See also Prebisch (1959).
Gereffi, power involves the ability to out-source lower value-added activities and to retain or incorporate those with higher value-added. 25 As noted by Raikes et al., under the GCC approach, power is usually regarded in an 'all or nothing' terms: it usually disregards degrees of power along the chain and assumes a polar structure in which one node of the chain is taken as dominant. 26 As mentioned above, the GCC approach was usually applied to industrial chains and largely ignored their historical/cyclical context. Both the historical and cyclical contexts are embedded. On the one hand, the historical context is actually provided by the world-system theory that describes how capitalism evolved within the worldsystem. On the other hand, cycles are explained by a Schumpeterian notion of development.
There have been some efforts though to construct the global commodity chain analysis with a more detailed historical context. Although there are just a few contributions in this direction 27 , its proponents tend to reject the center-periphery assumption of GCC. By doing so, they typically reject the world-system theory altogether replacing it with more neoclassical economic reasoning and modern standard trade theory models. A construction of a more detailed and integrated historical context becomes thus a requirement as it ceases to be embedded in and becomes commodityspecific. In this context, the evolution of the commodity chain over time now interacts with this more general and specific historical background. In the commodity chain approach, the macro dimension is usually explored but very little has been done to incorporate the micro dimension of the chain. In this regard, business archives provide a rich source to complement and verify assertions about commodity chain made at the 25 Hopkins and Wallerstein (1994) and Gereffi (1994) . 26 Raikes, Jensen and Ponte (2000, p. 402 macro level. The objective of this paper is exactly to bring business history to the fore: through the analysis between two nodes of the rubber chain, the paper shows that the rubber chain does not fit into the GCC framework. The dependentist view of rubber production does not seem valid either.
3
The Rubber Chain: Exporters, Exploitation & Dependency
Until mid-eighteenth century metallic currency was barely used in the Brazilian Amazon, and the bulk of transactions was carried out through exchanges of merchandises such as cotton. Only in 1749 was fiat money introduced, and a hundred years later it was still of scarce utilization due to slavery (which meant that many labor arrangements did not involve payment of wages) and geographical conditions (in more remote places people still preferred to exchange merchandises than to make transactions based on fiat money). Since colonial times, however, an informal credit channel had been evolving. The first economic activity of the region, the collection of drogas do sertão 28 , relied heavily upon the exchange of merchandises: the gatherer received merchandises in exchange for the product collected in the Amazon Forest. This informal credit channel was called aviamento which means credit without money. 29 Therefore, according to the literature, aviamento turned to be the typical credit channel in the Amazon Region. During the rubber boom the aviamento was roughly organized into a horizontal channel (see Figure 1 ) in which the estate owner advanced the merchandises to the tapper in exchange for a promise to deliver a certain quantity of rubber. This merchandise was supposed to be the means of living that would allow him to concentrate solely on rubber extraction. The estate owner, in turn, was financed by an aviador, who was merely an intermediary who bought the merchandises from the export houses (or from importers with the money advanced by the export houses) which were the ultimate source of funding in that credit channel. Supposedly, these export houses were controlled from abroad and their surplus drained to core economies, notably the USA, Britain, France and Germany. In these economies, the rubber chain was much simpler: there were rubber traders (importers of crude rubber) who supplied the manufacturing firms, either directly or through an intermediary or agent.
Figure 1 -The Rubber Chain
Source: Elaborated by me, following a stylised version of the rubber chain.
The aviamento credit channel encompassed all nodes of the rubber chain located within the Brazilian Amazon and was much more complex than what this 'Weberian' ideal credit chain suggests. It hides several other relationships between the economic agents involved in the rubber chain as the degree of verticalization increased over time, especially during the last decade of the rubber boom (1900) (1901) (1902) (1903) (1904) (1905) (1906) (1907) (1908) (1909) (1910) . First, several intermediaries possessed their own ships to transport rubber from the jungle to warehouses in Belém or Manaus. Secondly, these intermediaries invariably ended up possessing some rubber estates, either following a business plan or as a consequence of foreclosure of rubber estates for collection of debts from their clients. Thirdly, some intermediaries also exported part of their rubber and could then be considered as export houses. Conversely, some export houses ventured into the intermediary market and also ended up renting or buying rubber estates. agriculture, cattle or other traditional activity of the region. The opposition eventually faded as most of the old elite were integrated into rubber production or profited indirectly from it. However, the organization of crude rubber production in the Brazilian Amazon continued to be denounced. The usual complaint was that the [foreign] export houses, sitting at the top of the chain, were absorbing most of the profits from rubber production. The credit channel was criticized by contemporaries such as Woodroffe. For him, the credit chain entailed exploitation at each layer of the rubber chain, Contemporary descriptions such as these could be tediously repeated. What is important is to understand how these descriptions shaped the way researchers later perceived the rubber boom. Some authors indeed followed this exploitative line of argument to construct a dependentist view of the rubber boom in the Brazilian Amazon. 34 Their views can be summarized in the following way. Debt-peonage, bondage, semi-serfdom or indenture system was at the heart of rubber production in the Brazilian Amazon since it developed as the commonest outcome of migration to the Amazon. The underlying idea was that in order to move, the laborer indebt himself and, once having arrived at the rubber estate, was exploited. Rubber laborers were generally described as comprised of a mass of dehumanised and defenceless men who were exploited by cruel and greedy capitalists due to the latter's monopoly over the means of production (rubber fields and tools). In turn, rubber estate owners were also usually taken as having power to enforce the so-called 'Rules of the Rubber Fields' which dictated that fugitive laborers would be returned to their original rubber fields. Since the laborer was inside the forest and worked alone, escape was normally a difficult enterprise since there were not many alternatives left. If the conditions prevailing in the forest were not sufficient to entice laborers to work, rubber estate owners could resort to physical punishment, or so the literature argued.
Violence was at least assumed as a latent threat that shaped labor relations during Prado and Capelato (1975) , Santos (1980) and Bunker (1985) .
labor had to be controlled or coerced. This account of the rubber boom was extended to the other links of the rubber chain providing the basis of a Dependentist view of rubber production in the Brazilian Amazon. The credit channel was organized in a vertical way, in which every node was exploiting the node immediately beneath it. In this view, rubber production was the outcome of several successive exploitative relations along the rubber chain in which most of the surplus was drained by [foreign] export houses. These foreign export houses, in turn, were merely agents of foreign buyers who were the ultimate winners. Monopoly of capital was the mechanism that provided the rationale for such exploitative system. In this setting, at first glance, the rubber chain could neatly fit into the GCC framework.
The Dependentist view and the GCC approach certainly have different rationales, but some parallels can be drawn between their predictions. For the GCC approach, the manufacturers were the winners as they concentrated capital, technology (vulcanization) and skills that sanctioned a lower level of competition and higher profitability.
Manufacturers should have thus retained the most profitable activities and outsourced the least profitable ones. In this context, traders would merely be agents of industrial interests as much as suppliers of raw rubber would be tied to traders: surplus was thereby sucked up from supply to the manufacturing core. In turn, for the Dependentist literature the ultimate winners were the foreign traders but only because their proponents were applying a partial analysis to the rubber chain. If we apply their rationale for the nodes located in the manufacturing countries, we certainly ended up with the same result from the GCC approach: manufacturers were the most profitable agents of the rubber chain. Even though competition was not central to their analysis (rather the Domarian and Marxist frameworks were), it helped explain the way foreign traders generated 'monopoly' surpluses from the chain that were drained to the manufacturing economies.
Rubber Trade: Stylized Facts
The Brazilian Amazon (periphery) was thus a producer of raw material (crude rubber)
to supply rubber manufacturing companies located at core economies, notably, the USA and Britain. In this regard, the GCC and Dependentist literatures would suggest the following points:
1. The nodes located in the manufacturing countries were the most profitable ones;
2. There was a situation of dependency and exploitation along the chain in which, from the Brazilian Amazon perspective, foreigners were profiting the most;
3. Competition should increase and Profitability decrease as we move from rubber manufacturing to raw rubber supply.
However, crude rubber production may have been extremely profitable and not as competitive as the GCC approach would let us believe. Thus export houses had to be foreign-owned, controlled from abroad. This is the rationale for the dependentist view of the rubber chain: the blame was invariably on the [foreign] export houses which extracted most of the surplus generated in the rubber production. But did nationality of capital really matter? How concentrated were Brazilian Amazon's rubber exports? Were the export houses only agents of foreign buyers? Were they really exploiting the rubber chain? These questions are all interconnected and to provide answers, it is necessary to look at the export market in Brazil and see its interactions with buyers located abroad.
That is the objective of this section and of the following one.
Active foreign participation in the Amazonian trade can probably be dated from the 1850s when two foreign export houses appeared in the city of Belém (and would However, as Weinstein (1983) has already claimed, origin of capital is not as important as their relationship with foreign buyers. We will come back to this point later in this section. 36 Weinstein (1983, pp. 195-196 Looking at the names of the companies in Figure 2 above, it is clear that some export houses operated in both cities. Barham and Coomes (1996, pp. 32-35) . 41 Note that Comptoir Colonial Français was a French concern that was created with the intention of verticalize the entire rubber chain through "modern" methods of management. The company was nonetheless a fiasco entering in liquidation still during the boom, possibly because the managers neglected Amazonian institutions. The company was a successor of J.M.Marques who sold out his entire intermediary and exporting business. See Weinstein (1983) .
place, especially because the main trade journals were published in English and a few people spoke English in the Amazon between 1870 and 1910. It is unlikely that even the majority of immigrants spoke that language, as most of them were Portuguese. 42 Secondly, production was decentralized but the decision upon levels of production may not have been as decentralized as claimed by Barham and Coomes (1996) : the trade was controlled by a handful of firms and their orders and funding ultimately defined the quantity of rubber to be produced. Thirdly, Barham and Coomes' account of the rubber trade is not accurate. Trade was not exactly free inasmuch as some of the transactions may have been hidden under forward contracts and only part of the trade occurred in spot markets. The free market they refer to is the marginal market: a) the Brazilian spot market was supplied by the rubber produced in excess of the forward contracts set by the export houses; b) in the USA and in Britain, the spot market was fed by the rubber ordered in excess of the forward contracts. They might differ quite substantially, as it is not clear that Brazilian export houses would only make orders following orders coming from abroad: as next section shows, it is not true that Amazonian export houses were simply agents of foreign manufacturers. Actually, according to a representative of the Sears Commercial Company (one of the main rubber importing firms into the USA), manufacturers did not have stakes in export houses placed in Brazil and nor did they in importers placed in their home countries. 43 It is thus very likely that these rubber traders speculated quite a lot. 42 True, information from these articles eventually found their way into the Amazon via local newspapers. However, the level of illiteracy was very high and probably only the elite could read them. Even if it is believed that information could have spread by 'word-of-mouth', it would take long to reach the most remote parts of the Amazon forest. The degree of competition in the rubber trade seems then to have been very If rubber exporters in Brazil are assumed to have simply followed orders coming from abroad, origin of capital mattered little and the critical thing is actually the nationality of their main buyers and the relationship they possessed with them.
44 India Rubber World, March 1902, p. 177. Although partly Brazilian funded, the behavior of that company differed in no significant way from foreign export houses. See Weinstein (1983) . 45 New York Times, Oct. 23rd, 1885 . Sears Pará Co. was established in 1882 by R. T. Sears, W. R. Grace, M. P. Grace and C. R. Flint to carry out 'legitimate trade', as opposed to speculation. The firm made purchases of rubber through large advances to rubber receivers, making delivery to rubber manufacturers at market prices. 46 New York Times, Feb. 19th, 1913. However, different export houses had different goals, as some acted as agents for rubber manufacturers whereas others were simply brokers. Mincing Lane (1858-1859). In 1860, they moved to 24 Mark Lane where they remained throughout the rubber boom. 47 The company collection is comprised of ledgers, account sales, bills receivable, cash books, coffee purchase book, expenditure daybook, invoice book, and journals. However, only the ledgers and the cash books overlap with the rubber boom . The ledgers are divided into three handwritten notebooks: 1873-1886, 1887-1900, and 1901-1910. 48 They show more detailed information on the company's Balance Sheets than what was ultimately published and submitted to the London Stock Exchange. Whereas the published Balance Sheets only showed consolidated accounts, the handwritten ledgers provide all information related to that account at the end of the year. The cash book only refer to the period 1904-1910 but provides even more detailed information. In every account, it is possible to see all operations credited/debited, even if it is the same operation repeated several times during the year. It further shows the date when these operations took place. Therefore, 47 Records of the company were donated to the Guildhall Library in 2005, catalogued and given free access to the public at the Manuscript Section. The surviving records used here refer to Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1873 -1910 ) and Cash Books (1904 -1910 whilst the ledgers provide a snapshot of the financial situation of the company at the end of the year, the cash books provide information for all operations that happened within that same year. 49 From the company's balance sheets, it is not possible to know where funding came from, but they provided some clues. Dividends were rarely paid (or at least they were not explicitly stated in the balance sheets) and when they did, they usually referred to someone from the Schluter's family or some other German investor 50 . The company seldom borrowed money and when it did, very small amounts were involved. It is possible that members of the Schluter family might have individually borrowed money and invested it in the company but, unfortunately, if these transactions ever existed, it
was not possible to trace them. Small loans were sometimes given to individuals and companies but they were never significant either.
A significant amount of money was invested in stock shares of several companies. The composition of the company's portfolio changed substantially over time.
In the 1870s, investments in shares were very limited and indicated a tendency to invest in Central Europe, notably in Hungary. In the 1880s, investment in English concerns started to abound in parallel with a shift of investments towards Asia and the River Schluter & Co. Accounts. Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1873 -1910 ) and Cash Book (1904 -1910 Bonds & Coupons' and 'Argentine Ced. Nacional B'. Indeed, from 1888, investments in Argentina became more diversified with the company holding shares in a railway, a water supply & drainage company and an investment trust. Investments elsewhere also became more diversified with an important stake on 2 copper companies besides investments in aluminum production, an ammunition company and banks. 52
In the 1890s, investments in Argentina continued to dominate in a context in which the portfolio of the Company substantially increased, comprising investments in several different sectors: tobacco, cotton, petroleum, railway, trading, sugar refining, sugar, banks, waterworks, etc. The portfolio further showed a broader geographical coverage: Portugal, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Cuba, North America, Borneo, England, Germany, etc. After the turn of the century, the portfolio diminished in size and in composition with an increasing participation of government loans: besides Argentine bonds, Japanese and Brazilian bonds also appeared in the portfolio. 53 From the records of the company, it is difficult though to assess the profitability of these investments but it is possible to speculate that the reduction of the company's investments in the 1900s
were a consequence of losses incurred in the 1890s when several holdings were written off (possibly due to the economic and credit crisis in Argentina). From 1870s to 1910, in contrast to its investments, the company became more and more concentrated in the market of a very few products: coffee, rubber, tea and to a much lesser extent cocoa. Even though coffee was the main product traded by the company, this product will not be analyzed here as the interest rests solely on the rubber trade (more specifically on the Brazilian rubber trade). Schluter & Co.
distributed rubber to the European Continent and to the USA (sometimes rubber was also shipped directly to the final destination) and several rubber manufacturers figured among the clients of the company: Dunlop Rubber Co., Northern Rubber Co., Rubber
Co. of Scotland, Russian-American India-Rubber Co., Spencer & Co., Clyde Rubber Co., Praeger Gummi W. Fabr., Unity Rubber Co. Ltd., among others. Andresen operations were usually channeled via Oporto that was connected to Manaus through its own transatlantic vessels. 57 Since there is no evidence that Schluter & Co.
ever transacted any other commodity with J.H.Andresen & Co., it is likely that most the of the transactions between this company and Andresen referred to rubber despite the fact that Andresen was a big player in the market of Brazil nuts. Conversely, Schluter & Co. was only buying a portion of Andresen's trade and thus the relationship was not a monopsony. Therefore, Andresen seems to have been an independent trader as well. 55 It is true that Schluter & Co. specified a separate account for shipping charges but it is not at all clear if the outstanding bills and debts of the S. Brocklehurst & Co. would refer to the rubber trade or to shipping charges. Anyway, only a few transactions with S. Brocklehurst & Co. were identified which would not be enough to make a full picture of the rubber trade as intended here. 56 Plane (1903, p. 45) . 57 LeCointe (1922, p. 249) . Source: (A) = Schluter & Co. Cash Book (1904 -1910 bills to be paid by Schluter. 58 In this period, Andresen was usually a net creditor of the company as it can be seen in the Figure Andresen's net debtor position was henceforth always close to zero, payable bills vanished from the balance sheets and the financial transactions between these two firms decreased drastically, especially after 1906 (with the exception of the year 1909). 60 58 Schluter & Co. Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1887 -1900 , Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, catalogue reference: MS 35976. 59 Schluter & Co. Ledgers/Balance Sheets (1900 -1904 , Manuscript Section at Guildhall Library, catalogue reference: MS 35977. 60 Schluter & Co. Cash Book (1904 -1910 This change in strategy can also be inferred from Schluter's investment portfolio.
Despite the importance of the rubber trade for the company, until 1907 there was no direct investment in any rubber producing venture. As can be seen from Figure 6 below, from that year onwards, the company started to invest in several plantation companies usually located in South East Asia despite the large sum invested in guayule production in 1910. 62 Guayule Rubber Co. Ltd. was a company operating in Mexico from wild guayule rubber sources whose total authorized capital amounted to £400,000 (which was fully paid-up). 63 Therefore, despite the huge investment in this company, Schluter & Co. had just over 1% of the venture. Additionally, there is no evidence that the company ever invested in any of its partners in the Brazilian rubber trade even though it is possible that a certain member of the Schluter family might have personally invested in, say, Andresen.
61 If this was a conscious decision it is impossible to know. It might very well be the case that J.H.Andresen & Co. decided to change its trade partner in Europe and not the opposite. 62 Schluter & Co. Ledger/Balance Sheets (1901 -1910 It is still necessary to unveil more data from Agent export houses and analyze their relationship with foreign buyers to see if their commercial relationship was really so dissimilar from the one depicted here. However, as most of these agent export houses represented a foreign trader rather than a manufacturer, it is possible that the only difference referred merely to the place where the speculation occurred. The commercial activities discussed here would be replicated in the consumer's markets (mostly in New York, Liverpool, London, Havre or Hamburg) between the foreign rubber trader and the manufacturer. In this regard, it is instructive to see the relationship between the New York Commercial Co. and the US Rubber Co. The former firm was a pool of US rubber traders organized by Charles Flint in order to control the rubber market and force prices down. The US Rubber Co., in turn, was a result of several mergers of rubber manufacturing companies (also architected by Flint) that aimed at increasing bargaining power in the rubber markets. Looking at the purchases of rubber for the year of 1893, we can see that the New York Commercial Co. was buying rubber on account of the US Rubber Co. in exchange for a commission. Despite suggests that export houses placed in Brazil were profiting substantially, much more than foreign buyers. These export houses had room for maneuver to speculate in the market leaving foreign buyers and manufacturers at their mercy. Their market power originated from their local connections with intermediaries (some of them were actually intermediaries themselves) and/or through simple advancement of credit. There is no evidence that rubber exporters placed in Brazil were not exploiting their market power or that they were facing strong monopsony power. Moreover, the results here seem to contradict the dependentist theory too, insofar as many of these export houses (and, especially intermediaries) were partly or wholly Brazilian owned. The essence of our story here is that the behavior of export houses placed in Brazil was not defined by their nationality but rather by their bargain position which depended on market conditions and on the actions of other players.
Final Remarks
The Global Commodity Chain (GCC) approach addresses questions about what products countries do (and should) import and export in relation to complex institutions. Instead of deriving trade patterns from optimizing behavior of rational economic agents, for GCC, trade is taken as embedded in, and to a considerable extent as determined by specific (but changing) institutional structures. The Global Commodity Chain approach is a development of the world-system theory at the micro level and, as such, it is an extension of the dependency theory. Instead of the Prebischian notion of dependency being created from increasingly unequal terms of trade, in the world-system theory, the global market is an uneven playing field, underscored by the existing hierarchy between core and periphery areas that translates into a relation of power between nodes of the commodity chain located in these two areas.
The proponents of the commodity chain approach, however, reject the centerperiphery assumption of GCC. By doing so, they typically reject the world-system theory altogether replacing it with more neoclassical economic reasoning and modern standard trade theory models. A construction of a more detailed and integrated historical context becomes thus a requirement as it ceases to be embedded in and becomes commodity-specific. In this context, the evolution of the commodity chain over time now interacts with this more general and specific historical background. In the commodity chain approach, the macro dimension is usually explored but very little has been done to incorporate the micro dimension of the chain. Business archives provide a rich source to complement and verify assertions about commodity chain made at the macro level. But, what can we learn from the business history of the rubber chain?
First, like in Frank and Musacchio (2006) , the paper shows that GCC does not provide a useful framework to the analysis of certain commodity chains, in particular, the rubber chain. 70 Secondly, despite Barham and Coomes' (1996) claims and now, to some extent, contrary to Frank and Musacchio (2006) , the export market was not at all 70 Frank and Musacchio (2006) .
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free and there was substantial room for collusion among a few firms. 71 Since most of these firms were foreign-owned, at first glance, the dependentist view seems to have been right: foreign-owned export houses were extracting most of the surplus from the Brazilian rubber chain. However, there are problems with this interpretation. First, there is no evidence that export houses colluded. Secondly, foreign export houses were sometimes capitalized by Brazilian/Portuguese capital as well. The distinction of nationality of capital was not so black and white and what really mattered was the relationship between export houses placed in Brazil and their foreign buyer(s). If all export houses were solely agents of a single (or a very few) foreign buyer, most of the surplus was probably drained to agents placed abroad. If these firms were able to speculate, it is expected that their profits were much higher and appropriated [at least partly] internally. As argued here, export houses were not mere agents of foreign rubber buyers. Moreover, they probably profited the most in the rubber chain, much more than their foreign buyers anyway.
Indeed, the analysis of the relationship between one Brazilian/Portuguese rubber exporter and one British rubber buyer indicates that the relationship between them resembled a usual trade relationship in which both companies benefited.
However, if any company exercised market power, it was probably the Brazilian/Portuguese export house. Generalizations from this case study are hard to draw as it is difficult to know how typical this relationship was but the Brazilian/Portuguese export house might have enjoyed some market power at the 71 Barham and Coomes (1996) and Frank and Musacchio (2006) . British buyer's expense, contradicting, at first glance, the fact that export houses in Brazil were generally solely operating on behalf of buyers placed in Europe and in the USA. There is no evidence that rubber exporters placed in Brazil were prevented from exploiting their market power or that they were facing monopsony power. Rubber manufacturers were to some extent in the hands of rubber traders, be they Brazilian, Portuguese, Germans, French or English. This result certainly brings the rubber chain away from the ideal Wallersteinian chain type. More business history of the rubber chain (and of other commodity chains) is needed to verify or falsify some of the assumptions made at the macro level of analysis. As shown here, the micro analysis shows additional information that helps understand the rubber chain.
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